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Why Time Seems to Pass Slowly for Unpleasant
Experiences and Quickly for Pleasant
Experiences: An Explanation Based on Decision
Theory
Laxman Bokati and Vladik Kreinovich

Abstract It is known that our perception of time depends on our level of happiness:
time seems to pass slower when we have unpleasant experiences and faster if our
experiences are pleasant. Several explanations have been proposed for this effect.
However, these explanations are based on specific features of human memory and/or
human perception, features that, in turn, need explaining. In this paper, we show that
this effect can be explained on a much more basic level of decision theory, without
utilizing any specific features of human memory or perception.

1 Formulation of the Problem
Perceived time is different from actual time: empirical fact. Many of us have
felt that time seems to pass quickly for pleasant experiences and slowly for unpleasant ones. We seem to overestimate time elapsed for unpleasant experiences and
underestimate time elapsed for pleasant ones. For example:
• If we are watching a movie we really like, or if we are out on a date with someone
we love, hours go by and it fells like only few minutes have passed.
• On the other hand, if we are in a situation where we have to conceal something
from people around us – a situation that makes us uncomfortable – we cannot
wait for the focus of people or the topic of conversation to be shifted to someone
or something else, in such a situation even few seconds feels like long minutes;
see, e.g., [10].
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In all these cases, while the actual time for those experiences doesn’t change, our
perception of this time changes depending on the experience.
How is this phenomenon explained now. There are several explanations for this
effect; see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 13], but these explanations are based on specific features of
human memory and/or human perception, features that, in turn, need explaining.
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we show that this effect can be explained
on a much more basic level of decision theory, without utilizing any specific features
of human memory or perception.

2 Decision Theory: A Brief Reminder and the Resulting
Explanation
What is decision theory. Decision theory describes the preferences of a rational
agent – i.e., a person who, e.g., if he/she prefers option 𝐴 to option 𝐵 and 𝐵 to
𝐶, will always prefer option 𝐴 if provided with two options: 𝐴 and 𝐶; see, e.g.,
[5, 7, 9, 11, 12].
Comment. In real life, people are rarely fully rational, as our ability to process
information in short time and make optimal decision is limited; see, e.g., [6, 8].
However, decision theory still provides a reasonably accurate description of human
behavior.
Utility: the main notion of decision theory. Decision theory shows that for each
rational agent, we can assign a number – known as utility – to each possible alternative, so that in each situation of choice, the agent selects an alternative whose utility
is the largest [5, 7, 9, 11, 12].
Utility is influenced by the past evens as well. People’s moods and preferences are
affected not only by the current events, but also by the events that happened in the
past. This makes sense: past experiences help make reasonable decisions.
In decision theory terms, preferences are described by the utility values. In these
terms, a person’s current utility value depends not only on the situation at the present
moment of time 𝑡0 , but also on the utilities 𝑢 1 , 𝑢 2 , . . . , at the previous moments of
time 𝑡 1 > 𝑡2 > . . .
How can we describe this influence: the notion of discounting. Let us denote by
𝑢 0 the utility that we would have gotten at the current moment of time 𝑡 0 if the past
did not influence our current decision making. To describe this influence, we need to
find out how the current utility value 𝑢 depends on this utility 𝑢 0 and on the utilities
𝑢 1 , 𝑢 2 , etc., at the previous moments of time, i.e., what is the dependence
𝑢 = 𝑓 (𝑢 0 , 𝑢 1 , 𝑢 2 , . . .)

(1)

The effect of past events on our behavior is relatively small, the largest factor is
our decisions is still the current situation. Since the effect of the values 𝑢 1 , 𝑢 2 , . . . ,
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etc. is small, we can do what physicists do in similar situations (see, e.g., [4, 14]):
expand the dependence (1) in Taylor series in terms of 𝑢 𝑖 and keep only linear terms
in this expansion. Thus, we get the following formula:
𝑢 = 𝑓0 (𝑢 0 ) + 𝑓1 (𝑢 0 ) · 𝑢 1 + 𝑓2 (𝑢 0 ) · 𝑢 2 + . . .

(2)

When there is no influence of past events, the resulting utility is simply equal to 𝑢 0
– by definition of 𝑢 0 . Thus, we have
𝑓0 (𝑢 0 ) = 𝑢 0 ,

(3)

𝑢 = 𝑢 0 + 𝑓1 (𝑢 0 ) · 𝑢 1 + 𝑓2 (𝑢 0 ) · 𝑢 2 + . . .

(4)

so
The value 𝑓𝑖 (𝑢 0 ) depends on the moment of time 𝑡𝑖 – naturally, the more recent
ones affect more, the more distance one affect less. Let us describe this dependence by
writing 𝑓𝑖 (𝑢 0 ) as 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡𝑖 ). Here, the function 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) is non-positive – since positive
past events make us feel better, while negative past events make us feel worse. As
time 𝑡 decreases, the effect decreases, i.e., the function 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) is increasing, going
from the zero limit value 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) when 𝑡 → −∞ to a positive value 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) for
moments 𝑡 which are close to the current moment 𝑡0 . Thus, the formula (4) takes the
following form:
𝑢 = 𝑢 0 + 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡1 ) · 𝑢 1 + 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡2 ) · 𝑢 2 + . . .

(5)

Comment. As we have mentioned, the past values 𝑢 1 , 𝑢 2 , etc., affect the utility less
than current value 𝑢 0 . In economics, a similar decrease of value with time is a
particular example of a discount. Because of this analogy – and since economics
is one of the main application areas of decision theory – this decrease is known as
discounting.
Time is subjective. In contract to computers that have inside a reasonably precise
clock, we humans operate on subjective time: sometimes our processes go faster,
sometimes they go slower – e.g., when we are sleepy or asleep. The whole empirical
phenomenon that we try to explain is exactly about the difference between this
subjective time and the clock-measured physical time.
To a large extent, whether we slow down our perception of time or speed up, is
within our brain’s control. So how does the brain select whether to slow down or to
speed up subjective time?
Let us apply decision theory to our selection of subjective time. In line with the
general ideas of decision theory, our brain decides whether to slow down or to speed
up depending on which option leads to larger utility.
How does subjective time affect our utility? Subjective time is all we observe, all
we feel. Thus, in the formula (4) describing current utility, we should use subjective
times 𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , etc., instead of the actual (physical) moments of time 𝑡 𝑖 . In other words,
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in view of the fact that the subjective time may be different from the physical time,
the formula (5) describing current utility value takes the following form:
𝑢 = 𝑢 0 + 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠1 ) · 𝑢 1 + 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠2 ) · 𝑢 2 + . . .

(6)

Interestingly, already this formula leads to the desired explanation. Let us explain
how.
Resulting explanation: case of pleasant experiences. If we are in the middle of
a positive time period, i.e., if the current experience and all recent past experience
are positive, this means that 𝑢 𝑖 > 0 for all 𝑖. In this case, the larger each coefficient
𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠𝑖 ), the larger the resulting sum (6).
We have mentioned that the function 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) is an increasing function of time.
Thus, to increase the value 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠𝑖 ), we need to select the subjective value 𝑠𝑖 of the
𝑖-th past moment as large as possible – i.e., bring it as close to the current moment
of time as possible, i.e., take 𝑠𝑖 > 𝑡𝑖 .
In this case, the subjective time duration 𝑡0 − 𝑠𝑖 decreases in comparison with
the corresponding period 𝑡0 − 𝑡 𝑖 of physical time, i.e., subjective time goes faster –
exactly as we observe.
Resulting explanation: case of unpleasant experiences. On the other hand, if we
are in the middle of a negative time period, i.e., if the current experience and all
recent past experience are negative, this means that 𝑢 𝑖 < 0 for all 𝑖. In this case, the
smaller each coefficient 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠𝑖 ), the larger the resulting sum (6).
We have mentioned that the function 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑡) is an increasing function of time.
Thus, to decrease the value 𝐹 (𝑢 0 , 𝑠𝑖 ), we need to select the subjective value 𝑠𝑖 of
the 𝑖-th past moment as small as possible – i.e., bring it as far away from the current
moment of time as possible, i.e., take 𝑠𝑖 < 𝑡𝑖 .
In this case, the subjective time duration 𝑡0 − 𝑠𝑖 increases in comparison with
the corresponding period 𝑡 0 − 𝑡 𝑖 of physical time, i.e., subjective time goes slower –
exactly as we observe.
Conclusion. So, in both cases, decision theory indeed explains the desired phenomenon.
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